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Turkey’s demonstrations have been illustrated on the global news for the past few 
weeks. Wholly unacceptable images of police brutality and government’s arrogance 
have been at the epicentre of the myriad accounts of the events. In the heat of the 
moment, especially the participants prefer to see the on-going unrest as a 
revolutionary event. A vague revolutionary fantasy has been filling their heads as they 
dream of a new beginning for Turkish society. However this paper aims to challenge 
certain over simplistic and deteriorating myths. In doing so, it holds the argument that 
the recent events can be best described not as the prelude of a revolution but only as a 
democratic purge in a developing economy.  
Like in every similar case journalists and scholars are tempted to compare on-
going events with glorious previously held ones. A lot have fallen into this trap to link 
the protests with those that recently took place in Arab countries, the so –called ‘Arab 
Spring’. However, this equivalence is by no means accurate. Still, the ruling AKP party 
in Turkey not only won the last polls in 2011 but even today enjoys a widespread 
support in the country. Nevertheless, the most fundamental difference with the 
protests of the Arab uprising and even the Occupy movement lies in the field of the 
economy. In the same realm, massive demonstrations and protests of the Los 
Indignados in southern Europe were mainly caused by the long-standing economic 
crisis and the neoliberal austerity in rapidly declining economies. While in all these 
cases from the Mediterranean cities to the Western core of the Occupy movement the 
young educated middle-class were protesting against their economic suffering, in 
Turkey the economic growth of the past decade has produced considerable benefits 
for the population. In particular, the emerging new middle-class in Turkey has seen its 
living standards rapidly increase during the AKP’s time in office. Therefore any 
comparison between the protests in Turkey and the recent turmoil in Mediterranean 
and the West lacks a basic understanding of the people’s demands.  
The central argument that this paper holds here is that in search of historical 
comparisons the Turkish protests have more similarities with those that took place in 
1968 and especially in Mexico in the summer of 1968 than any other case. In July 1968 
as the echo from the uprisings in Paris and Prague was fading away, students in 
Mexico revolted against the government of President Gustavo Diaz Ordaz.2 The 
protests ended with the Tlatelolco massacre in October 1968. Despite their national 
peculiarities, from a political economy perspective these countries share a lot of 
common features.  
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Rising Economies 
The main common denominator in the cases of Turkey and Mexico is their economic 
performance. Turkey and Mexico are developing countries with dynamically emerging 
economies. Samuel P. Huntington calls both Turkey and Mexico, along with Russia 
and Australia, torn countries that have reformed to a ‘modern economic system’ but 
have maintained their traditions.3 Notwithstanding analyses that could not move 
beyond the fallacious binary of secularism vs. Islamism have failed to grasp the new 
economic realities. 
Both economies enjoyed a period of growth before the outbreak of the unrests. 
During the 1960s, the high growth of the Mexican economy (graph 1) along with low 
rates of inflation made observers refer to the ‘Mexican Miracle’. Mexico’s post-war 
inward-looking economic development was comprised of a rapid industrialization 
along with a trade protectionist policy.4 During these ‘’golden years’’ Mexico’s 
economy was industrialized and modernized.  
Graph 1: Mexico GDP growth, 1960-19695 
 
Graph 2: Mexico GDP, 1960-19696 
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Turkey has managed to swiftly recover from the 2001 crisis by adopting fiscal 
and financial reforms under the Ecevit coalition government.7 The reforms that were 
initiated by the minister of finance Kemal Dervis moved forward with the advent of 
the AKP government. Macroeconomic stabilization and structural reforms resulted in 
a stable GDP growth up until the outbreak of the global crisis (Graph 4). Turkey 
succeeded to make her final payment on its IMF debt in May 2013 just few weeks 
before the outbreak of the demonstrations.8 Turkey’s economy has performed 
remarkably well amid a global financial crisis. During this period Turkey has generated 
high annual growth rates. The good economic performance of the past decade has 
dramatically improved the income and the living standards of the vast majority of 
Turkish citizens.  
Graph 3: Turkey GDP growth, 2000-20139 
 
Graph 4: Turkey GDP, 2000-201310 
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Middle Classes and Problems in Democracy 
Against this background, new middle classes have arisen. The new generations of 
young educated and employed middle class with expanded expectations as citizens 
constitutes the vast majority of the participants in the protests who aspire to be the 
agents of change.  
The Mexican middle class in the 1960s enjoyed a quality of life unimaginable in 
previous decades. These children of the Mexican Revolution that now lived in comfort 
were, for the first time, able to send their own children to university in unprecedented 
numbers.11 Although the economy continued to flourish, social inequality remained a 
factor of discontent. Moreover, the Institutional Revolutionary Party’s (PRI) rule 
became increasingly authoritarian and at times oppressive.  
In the past decade the urban middle class in Turkey has enjoyed unprecedented 
economic prosperity but it was restricted by authoritarian politics and rigid morality. 
According to OCED Better Life Index 12, Turkey has made considerable progress in 
improving the quality of life of its citizens over the last two decades. In Turkey the 
Income and Living Conditions have dramatically improved in the past decade.13 
However, green space is a major issue in a megacity like Istanbul. In Turkey, 33% of 
people feel they lack access to green spaces, much more that the 12% average of OECD 
European countries.14  
Though in both cases governments were democratically elected by a high 
margin, there are structural problems in the democratic system. However despite its 
outward modernity, Mexico's politics were trapped in another age. The hegemonic 
party model allowed one party to monopolize power for almost 70 years. 15 
Nevertheless, The PRI enjoyed the popular support and maintained its hegemony 
during the 1960s. The one-state regime was leaving no political space for a credible 
opposition.  
Though the AKP government has taken important measures towards 
democratic reform, the electoral 10% threshold was designed to prevent a proper 
Kurdish representation in Ankara. The restriction of freedom of speech is a key issue 
in Turkey illustrated with the tight control of the media, on imprisoning journalists, 
especially those who express views critical of the authorities on the Kurdish issue. It is 
indicative that in the 2013 Reporters Without Borders World Press Freedom Index  
Turkey has fallen on 154th.16  
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A.K.P., has adopted an increasingly authoritarian attitude that threatens to 
control basic freedoms of the Turkish citizens. The latest measures that were 
undertaken by the Turkish government included the restriction of selling alcohol and 
the kiss in the metro. The decision to demolish one of few green spaces in the City and 
to build Ottoman barracks was the straw that broke the camel's back. It is worth 
noting that a lot of analyses fall into the trap of attributing this turmoil only to the 
long-standing conflict in the Turkish society that has its roots in the late Ottoman era. 
Unfortunately, these accounts only scratch the surface, as these social cleavages 
cannot fully explain the dynamics of the recent events.   
 
Dealing with the unrest 
One more common feature is the spontaneous character of the protest. There is also a 
lack of central leadership. In both cases the protests appear to have spontaneously 
exploded. These forms of collective action have not been initiated by a clear leadership 
figure. In Gezi Park the vast majority of the participants were not a member of any 
political party or association.17 The protestors are highly-educated.18Turkey has 
invested in the educational system in order to strengthen its human capital. 19 In 
Mexico also the main protestors were students who were not affiliated with any 
political party.20  
The role of women is important in both cases. In the case of Mexico a lot of 
women participated in leading positions. Actually these protests are now considered 
as the starting point of the Mexican feminism movements that gained momentum in 
the 1970s.21 The hegemonic and patriarchal model that Erdogan represents has been 
criticized by Turkish feminist groups. The public sphere is male dominated and it is 
reflected on the slogans of the resistance. Graffiti and slogans from the protestors 
often deploy a sexist and masculine language. However, there is an attempt by 
feminist and LGBT activists to reinvent the ‘language of resistance’. Feminist and 
LGBT activists for instance covered sexist graffiti attacking the Prime Minister. They 
even wore T-shirts calling to resist without swearing.22 
The governmental arrogance provided a fertile ground for the protests to gain a 
momentum. The driving force of both unrests was the aspiration of freedom and the 
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democratic purge. The economies were growing fast and they had created a new 
middle class with demands of being incorporated to the political processes. 
Same as in Mexico, Turkish government attempted to undermine the 
protestors by arranging demonstrations of their own. In the governmental rallies that 
were organised, the leaders exposed their unwillingness to compromise with the 
protestors. President Diaz Ordaz dismissed the public unrest in his national address 
and even threatened continued violence against any future demonstration of dissent. 
Aggressive and intimidating public addresses had acted as a red rag to a bull.  
Social media in case of Turkey played an important role in the mobilization and 
the communication of the demonstrators. The Turkish Prime Minister blamed social 
media as ‘the menace to society’.23 In the 1960s, when social media had not penetrated 
our lives, demonstrators were using more conventional ways and means of 
communication. President Diaz Ordaz held that the protestors had ‘a great capacity 
for propaganda and dissemination of falsehood and perversity.24 
Both the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) in Mexico and the Justice and 
Development Party (AKP) in Turkey acted stubbornly in dealing with the protesters. 
Governments’ initiatives aimed at discrediting the protests. Erdogan warned protesters 
to leave the Gezi Park and tension rose after Erdogan counter-rally.25 President Diaz 
Ordaz addressing the General Congress of the Union in September 1968 stated that 
though they had been tolerant until then, they would not continue to permit the 
violation of the legal order.26 The government made the distinction calling certain 
protestors peaceful while the rest marginal, extremisms and terrorists.  
The excessive use of force by the oppressive state apparatus, the police was 
observed in both cases. In Turkey thousands of teargas and water canon against 
demonstrators have been reported. In Mexico police used excessive violence in order 
to control the riots. A report on the brutality of riot control in Mexico it is indicative. 
Mexican Army units were utilized to assist police and riot police (Granaderos) in 
breaking up student riots which got out of control at the end of July. 27  
The protests both in Turkey and Mexico were highly influenced by the 
revolutionary spirit of the time. The Spring of 1968 highly influenced the students in 
Mexico. Some of the participants in the Turkish demos are Western educated and 
actually they have been participating in the Occupy movements in London and New 
York.  In Mexico their slogans often referred to the assassination of Ernesto Che 
Guevara that took place the previous year.  
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Legacy 
To sum up, the driving force behind the unrests both in Mexico 1968 and recently in 
Turkey is the changing economic conditions of the countries and their middle classes 
in particular. An improvement of the living standards for the newly arisen urban 
middle class does not automatically translate into more democratic rights. The 
demands and the concerns of the protestors showed that this highly-educated new 
generation feels marginalised and desires more political space that encompasses their 
interests.  
Applying Albert Hirschman’s terms in democratic states, dissatisfied citizens 
could respond to a deteriorating relationship with the government either with exiting 
or complaining (voice).28 The opted voice that citizens have raised could lead to an 
improvement of the government’s performance. What is needed now for the 
government is to take heed of the protestor’s concerns and attempt to accommodate 
them in a democratic and inclusive manner.  
AKP has been in power for over a decade. These protests are a wakeup call for 
AKP. Politically engaged and vociferous citizens are an asset for the democracy. 
Democratic reform to incorporate the concerns of the protestors is needed.   
Although the protests in Mexico 68 did not lead to any direct political change, 
they lead to a change of mind-set in the population. The protest was suppressed 
before this change was brought about. The protests in Mexico succeeded in shaping 
President Echeverria’s political initiatives.29 Echeverria’s reformism can be attributed 
to the 1968 events.  
Myriad accounts of the current financial crisis and the global unrests lack deep 
historical and theoretically informed analysis. The gradual resurgence of these 
phenomena should only be examined in a global economic context. The revolutionary 
spirit calling for more individual freedoms unleashed and paved the way to the 
economic neo-liberalism. There is a growing volume of literature that draws a direct 
linkage between the individualism that was cultivated after the 1968 uprisings and the 
neo-conservatism neo-liberal reforms that followed that. Now we have to wait to see 
what these recent upheavals will bring.30  
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